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People in the Ferghana Valley, whether on the Kyrgyz or Uzbek side of the 
border, like to compare their political system to that of their neighbouring 
country.2 The following quote from rural Ferghana, Uzbekistan illustrates the 
essence of the matter:
Kyrgyz people often boast about their country saying that they have a democ-
racy and that they can overthrow their presidents if they start to steal from the 
people. Of course, they can brag about their democracy as much as they want, 
but democracy brought only trouble to Kyrgyzstan. The state doesn’t exist there 
(“Qirg’izistonda davlat yoq”) and they overthrew their presidents several times, 
but nothing good happened. Instead, the lack of a strong state resulted in bloody 
Kyrgyz-Uzbek ethnic conflicts in June 2010. Their economy and living condi-
tions have gotten even worse in the post-Akaev period. As you see, democracy 
does not bring economic prosperity and political stability in our region. So, 
you can’t fill your stomach with democracy. In Uzbekistan, it is true we don’t 
have democracy and the level of corruption is very high, but most importantly 
we have a good governance (“Bizni davlatimizni boshqaruvi yaxshi”) and a 
very strong state that is capable of maintaining political stability and interethnic 
peace. We can sleep without any fear because our government really works. 
Even though we have a high unemployment rate and state salaries are very low, 
you can always find a way if you know the rules and make the right connections 
(“tanish-bilish”).
This comparison is useful for the following two reasons. First, it gives a 
clue to the existence of local (contextual) understanding of good governance 
in post-Soviet Uzbekistan, which implies that good governance is not about 
promoting democracy and rule of law, but it is more importantly about the 
government’s capacity to maintain political stability and interethnic peace. 
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This means that there are multiple understandings of “good governance” and 
that the global (Western) notions of good governance need to be contextual-
ised when discussing and analyzing the governance trajectories of post-Soviet 
societies like Uzbekistan. 
Second, this comparison indicates that, like in many modern states,3 the 
governance system in Uzbekistan is constructed in a way that induces citizens 
to engage in informal practices that help them “find a way” when the state 
(formal) structures fail to address their needs. In other words, this is a way 
that the “sistema” (system) works in Uzbekistan—a kind of governance that 
relies on informal rules, practices and networks. In both formal and informal 
governance systems, what is important is stability and predictability. While 
some analysts tend to label informal systems as “corrupt,” many anthropo-
logical studies of corruption emphasize a subjective element: the line between 
good sociability and corruption in many cultures is drawn by the ritual form 
and emotional valence of the transaction (e.g. propriety vs. humiliation).4 
This chapter explores the nuances in how citizens in Uzbekistan understand 
corruption versus good (albeit informal) governance. 
There are multiple paradigms and understandings of “good governance”, 
some of which concur with the Western understanding, while others offer 
alternative criteria. Thus, questions arise as what is a local understanding 
of “good governance” in Uzbekistan, how it works, how it is perceived and 
interpreted by the local population, and what implications it has for global 
debates on good governance? What are the relations between formal and in-
formal structures with regard to governance trajectories in Uzbekistan? 
DEMOCRACY VERSUS GOOD ENOUGH GOVERNANCE
Anyone who wants to understand politics in Central Asia needs to understand 
how local citizens perceive what, from the outside, may seem like impossi-
bly complex negotiations in everyday life. In most introductions to Central 
Asian politics, one can find references to the Economist Intelligence Unit 
Democracy Index scores for Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan (they are dismal) 
or Freedom House rankings of Uzbekistan as “not free” and Kyrgyzstan as 
“partly free.” Both in terms of electoral democracy and freedom of the press, 
Kyrgyzstan has historically been in much better shape than Uzbekistan and 
other Central Asian countries, but like in most countries, the government is 
the result not so much of the free will of individual citizens as of coalitions 
and compromises between patron-client networks.5
However, democracy is not end in itself; most of us are fans of democracy 
not because of some ideological prejudice that sees elections as a manifesta-
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tion of divine grace, but because democracies help promote the good life for 
their citizens and tend to produce a host of desirable public goods. Thus, it is 
important to note that when it comes to how governments promote the good 
life and the public good, there are distinct differences among these more or 
less “unfree” states of Central Asia. Undemocratic governments may be more 
or less good from the point of view of their citizens, more or less efficacious 
at promoting and implementing popular policies, stronger or more fragile. 
Uninformed observers might look at the facts and figures about the poor state 
of democracy in these countries and conclude that they are relatively similar, 
but when you look at them from the point of view of governance, some strik-
ing differences emerge and it is clear that it is safer to walk at midnight in 
Tashkent than in Bishkek.6 
The issue of governance is a major concept in political science today, 
as reflected in Francis Fukayama’s The Governance Project.7 Scholars of 
governance are responding to two trends: the failure of top-down reform in 
the post-Soviet world, and the durability of the dictatorships that were estab-
lished around the time of the Soviet collapse. Still, as Fukayama observes, 
there is a wide variance in the states that are commonly labelled authoritarian 
and democratic. More democracy does not necessarily result in better gov-
ernance (as he discusses in the U.S. case), and some authoritarian states are 
remarkably well governed (for which he draws on China as his example).8 
By asking whether good governance can lead to democracy and executive 
constraint by rule of law (rather than the other way around), Fukuyama turns 
on its head the first set of criteria most international organizations use when 
talking about comparative governance issues. For example, the World Bank 
defines governance as: 
the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. 
This includes the process by which governments are selected, monitored and 
replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement 
sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that 
govern economic and social interactions among them.9 
Governance research questions the causal relationships between these vari-
ous elements and asks us to look at whether good governance reforms in a 
country such as Uzbekistan can productively precede democracy.
Governance in Fukayama’s project is defined, at the most basic level, as 
“a government’s ability to make and enforce rules, and to deliver services” 
and “about the performance of agents in carrying out the wishes of princi-
pals, and not about the goals that principals set.”10 Good governance in this 
case is something close to high state capacity, public administration as op-
posed to politics, a focus on output measures with no value judgment about 
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the policy goals that the government is pursuing. Fukuyama’s approach also 
follows the good advice to disaggregate the state, acknowledging that some 
state entities will be more efficacious than others, and that states vary across 
regions, especially across the urban and rural divide. The state in Uzbekistan 
is certainly a powerful actor when it comes to using coercion and preventing 
political instability, but it is weak in terms of enforcing “rule of law” and 
service delivery. Fukyama’s notion of governance provides useful insights 
when measuring the state capacity but it can hardly help us satisfactorily ex-
plain the paradoxes of governance in Uzbekistan, where the citizens equate 
political stability and security to good governance. This means we need to go 
beyond the conventional definitions of governance and thereby employ ad-
ditional tools and concepts if we are to better understand the local dynamics 
and governance trajectories in Uzbekistan.
A concept that has more relevance is “good enough governance,” for-
warded by Merilee S. Grindle in the context of development assistance, and 
revived by Stephen D. Krasner in the context of U.S. programs to promote 
democracy abroad.11 Krasner argues that a well-functioning democracy is 
hard to maintain and exceptionally difficult to promote from outside, and a 
more effective way to promote long-term freedoms is “to improve the pros-
pects for security and economic growth in the short run—rather than pressing 
for direct democratic reforms.”12 Elections may make things worse in terms 
of prosperity and freedom, and Krasner argues that U.S. policy has been 
aiming at the wrong target in pushing countries like Iraq and Afghanistan 
toward consolidated democracy. Instead, Krasner argues that we should start 
thinking in terms of “good enough governance,” which consists of a state 
being able to provide for the physical integrity of its citizens (but not their 
more broadly defined human rights) as well as providing some basic public 
services, especially in the area of health; to provide public order including 
a norm of property rights, and some degree of security from transnational 
threats; to constrain corruption and provide some form of checks on the arbi-
trary power of the state through media or civil society; and since free and fair 
elections can produce instability and trigger violence, elections “would only 
be useful if they ratified and legitimated agreements that had been reached ex 
ante among political leaders with regard to control over security forces and 
the distribution of spoils.”13
Krasner’s analysis focuses mainly on post-conflict contexts, whereas 
Uzbekistan has a long history of stability, so the question remains: is good 
enough governance an adequate minimal standard for most people most of 
the time? If so, to what extent does Krasner’s “good enough governance” 
describe Uzbekistan from the perspective of ordinary people living there? In 
this chapter, we explore the specifics of governance systems in Uzbekistan 
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and suggest the importance of a contextual understanding of everyday life 
governance. This local Uzbek governance system consists of two important 
interrelated components: a government that heavily relies on coercive infra-
structure for maintaining political stability and interethnic peace, but at the 
same time induces its citizens to engage in informal practices and networks as 
an alternative (to the formal) source of welfare. These informal patterns can 
be gleaned by observing the interactions between ordinary citizens and state 
officials in the course of daily life. To the extent that such informal practices 
are knowable, predictable, and free of subjective perceptions of immorality, 
they may be perceived to be good enough governance, but as we will see, 
poor service delivery and the relative absence in the sistema of constraints on 
the arbitrary power of the state are where the government of Uzbekistan may 
fall short in the eyes of the population. 
This chapter describes how this system emerged in the post-Soviet period 
and explores some local understandings of good enough governance in Uz-
bekistan that emerge within everyday experiences of people as they talk about 
the role of the state, make moral judgments and engage in informal rules and 
practices. We make no claims about whether these forms of governance pro-
vide better or worse outcomes for citizens in the long term than other viable 
alternatives, but rather point out that this form of governance seems to have 
become the part and parcel of everyday life in Uzbekistan, largely internal-
ized by the ordinary citizens and low-level state officials as a ‘getting things 
done’ strategy. 
THE “SISTEMA” IN POST-SOVIET UZBEKISTAN
In the early 1990s, the political leadership of Uzbekistan made all sorts of 
bold claims about their strong commitment to democracy, market economy, 
human rights and the rule of law, as well as about their intention to break 
the stranglehold of totalitarian forms of governance. There was a widespread 
euphoria in Uzbekistan and in the outside world that the introduction of in-
stitutions of democratic government and market economy would promote a 
transformation for the better and contribute to Uzbekistan’s emergence as a 
“great state” in the world. History textbooks linked this great future to a glori-
ous past, highlighting the literary epics, great leaders, and scientists of Central 
Asia, while at the same time vilifying both Russian Imperial and Soviet rule 
in Central Asia. 
However, as Ruziev et al. describe, Uzbek authorities made it clear from the 
beginning that the “big bang” or “shock therapy” approach to transition would 
not be suitable for Uzbekistan.14 Instead, Uzbekistan adopted a “gradualist” 
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approach,15 following President Karimov’s decree that Uzbekistan would 
find “its own path” to political and economic independence.16 Uzbekistan 
remained dependent on the importation of consumer goods, currency con-
trols, and the exploitation of rural labour. Uzbek authorities were aware of 
the risk that a rapid transformation of the economy would affect the lives of 
millions, probably leading to social unrest. Hence, the Uzbek model of transi-
tion clearly reflected the concerns for political stability and the peculiarities 
of the structure of the economy. Preserving the stability of the economy and 
of social and political order has become an overarching rationale for rejecting 
all manner of economic and political reforms recommended by international 
institutions, and for developing a strict border regime.17
As a result of these gradualist policies, the Uzbekistan’s cumulative 
decline in GDP between 1989 and 1996 was the lowest of all the former 
Soviet republics. However, although the gradualist approach to transition 
contributed to a prevention of sharp output loss and consequential rise in 
unemployment and social unrest during the early years of transition, by 2000 
it became evident that the economy was simply stagnating.18 As Kandiyoti 
notes, the partial market reforms the government of Uzbekistan implemented 
in pursuit of stability paradoxically resulted in inefficient resource allocation 
and widespread corruption that required increased recourse to coercion.19 A 
growing body of scholarly literature demonstrates the ubiquity of corruption 
in Uzbekistan, focusing on kleptocratic elites in the upper echelons of the 
state organisation, malfunctioning public administration structures, adminis-
tratively-commanded economic policies, inefficient post-Soviet agricultural 
reforms, corrupt law-enforcement agencies, and inadequate ways of dealing 
with corruption by state authorities.20 Hence, active government intervention 
created significant administrative barriers and a high tax burden, thereby 
causing high transaction costs for national business and the prevalence of an 
informal economy. 
The Soviet legacy also had a profound impact on social policy strate-
gies of the Uzbek government in the 1990s. Given the fact that the former 
Soviet social welfare system did provide relatively strong social protection 
and healthcare facilities, the general population of Uzbekistan expected the 
same treatment and conditions from the new Uzbek authorities. Given the 
high proportion of low-income groups and the dependence on the import of 
consumer goods, any attempt at contraction of social welfare benefits would 
affect millions, which consequently would lead to social unrest. In the same 
vein, the main concern of the Uzbek authorities in the early years of indepen-
dence was the prevention of dramatic output loss, strong social protection and 
modernisation of the economy by strengthening the industrial sector.21 Thus 
the social welfare strategies adopted by the Uzbek authorities during the early 
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years of independence were almost identical to the Soviet-era practices.22 Uz-
bekistan did fairly well in terms of providing a social safety net, alleviating 
poverty and limiting spending cuts in education and healthcare, especially in 
the mid-1990s.23 Soviet-style centralised economic management and strong 
social protection measures seemed to be successful in the transition period, 
as they prevented large output decline and served to maintain a reasonable 
living standard. 
The “transition” lasted until about 2004 and then the picture largely stabi-
lized, but not in a way that provided for economic prosperity for the majority 
of Uzbekistan’s citizens. Although the Uzbek economy has been experienc-
ing above-trend rates of growth—about 7–8 per cent since 2004—these 
indicators hardly reflect everyday life in Uzbekistan where state salaries do 
not even secure survival, and people are compelled to use informal coping 
strategies to meet their livelihood needs.24 For much of the 2000s, the large 
number of Uzbek labour migrants in Russia and Kazakhstan provided clear 
evidence of the inadequacy of Uzbekistan’s economic and social policies for 
its poorer citizens. As Ruziev et al. state, the economic growth was not due to 
structural reforms, but to a better agricultural harvest, large inflows of money 
remittances sent by Uzbek migrant workers and more importantly, to favour-
able world prices for the country’s main products such as gold, cotton, natural 
gas and oil.25 Furthermore, Uzbek authorities withdrew social benefits with-
out creating alternative welfare structures. As a result, the absence of state 
support has created serious social problems, thereby transforming the family 
and communities into the main shock-absorbing structures of the society.26
The analysis of scholarly research on post-Soviet Uzbekistan indicates that 
very few Uzbeks reaped the rewards of the economic growth.27 Instead, this 
energy-driven economic growth comes at the expense of ordinary people in 
rural areas where service interruptions, often the absence of gas and electric-
ity supply to households during cold winter months, have become customary 
over the years. Uzbekistan has also made little progress in promoting the rule 
of law and good governance, and many formal institutions of government 
have merely a showcase quality.28 According to the 2016 Corruption Percep-
tions Index, released annually by Transparency International (TI), Uzbekistan 
is among the most corrupt in the world.29 The “control of corruption” indica-
tor of the World Bank Governance Studies also shows an extremely high level 
of corruption in Central Asian countries.30 
Yet the narrative of “transition” persists in the way the government justi-
fies its inadequacies in meeting the economic needs of the population. In the 
authors’ research, people rarely referred to the “transition” when explaining 
their economic difficulties; rather they locate the source of their difficulties in 
economic policies and low salaries, lack of jobs and strong social protection, 
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corruption, the high inflation rate, excessive interference of law-enforcement 
bodies and tax officials in business activities, customs duties that were too 
high, and tightened border controls. Studies have demonstrated that Uzbeks 
consider their governments inferior to the Soviet one.31 Despite the despotic 
and corrupt nature of the Soviet system, the majority of Uzbeks (especially 
among the older generation) express nostalgia for the former Soviet Union. 
They frequently mention the availability of inexpensive food, jobs, medical 
care, affordable housing, and education during the Soviet era. As Marianne 
Kamp notes, “the idea that this is a passing stage, and that Uzbekistan must 
and will arrive at capitalism and democracy, is dying more quickly among 
ordinary people in Uzbekistan than it is among outside ‘experts.’”32
The Uzbek regime is a “paradoxical strong-weak state” 33 which now ex-
tracts resources, exercises strong social control and foists their ideology on 
ordinary people without giving anything in return. Most of the people the au-
thor met during his fieldwork in rural Ferghana expressed their dissatisfaction 
with current economic and social policies, mentioning unaffordable health-
care and the high unemployment rate. These developments have had far-
reaching repercussions for political stability and security in Uzbekistan. As 
the state retreated from its social welfare obligations, so are ordinary citizens 
retreating from their loyalty to the current political system, as evidenced by 
growing social discontent, disobedience to legal systems and rising support 
for radical Islamic movements. However, this discontent does not necessarily 
lead to social action in Uzbekistan. The Arab Spring had a dramatic negative 
impact on democratic developments in Uzbekistan, serving as a “scapegoat” 
to demonise the Western human rights and democracy initiatives in the re-
gion. Ironically, the ruling regime often cites famous Western scholars, such 
as Samuel Huntington, who argue that establishing centralised authority, 
even by authoritarian means, is the prerequisite for any type of political or 
economic development. In light of rising Islamic fundamentalism and the 
threat posed by the Taliban in neighbouring Afghanistan, the ruling regime 
“securitized” the issue by convincing the population and supporters abroad 
that there is only one alternative to their rule—Islamic fundamentalism. In 
this regard, political leadership of Uzbekistan actively pursues the policy of 
“political stability at any cost” that provides justification for ruling regimes 
to deploy coercive strategies and penal sanctions as an exclusive means of 
social control. And this strategy appears to be working: the saying “och 
qornim—tinch qulog’im” (“a hungry stomach is better than a worried ear”) 
has become commonplace in Uzbekistan.
The international indicators of state capacity, such as World Bank gover-
nance rankings, the American Bar Association’s Central and Eastern Euro-
pean Law Initiative’s indices of judicial oversight, and International Crisis 
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Group reports, have portrayed Uzbekistan as a state that is simultaneously 
weak, predatory, and unstable.34 However, as we will show in the next sec-
tions, what is seen as the signs of weakness, instability and corruption by 
international reports and policy documents, actually constitute the form of 
governance in Uzbekistan. On the one hand, the state in Uzbekistan is heavily 
reliant on coercive and penal sanctions for maintaining political stability. But 
on the other hand, the state is potentially weak in terms of enforcing rule of 
law and has absolved itself from service delivery responsibilities by allowing 
informal practices and networks to serve as an informal welfare system. This, 
we argue, is the state of governance in Uzbekistan today and to understand it 
simply through the lens of corruption or state collapse would be to misunder-
stand what this experience of everyday life governance is like. 
INFORMALITY AND “EVERYDAY  
LIFE GOVERNANCE” IN UZBEKISTAN
As we argued in previous sections, in order to better understand the gov-
ernance trajectories in Uzbekistan, we need to explore them from the local 
level, since it is the local level where the state and citizens come into contact 
on a daily basis. The best we can do in a single chapter to give a flavour of 
this daily life is to feature a few vignettes from ethnographic field research. 
The ethnographic material illustrates the role of the informal economy as an 
alternative to the formal economy and the welfare structure in Uzbekistan 
that ordinary people and low-level state officials use in their everyday lives 
for coping with economic hardships. The main point we will make here is 
that what is viewed as a “corruption” from the outside is often an everyday 
form of governance from the insider’s perspective. This is the paradox of an 
authoritarian state with many laws and coercive structures and at the same 
time, daily life largely being regulated by informality, the process that we call 
in this chapter “everyday life governance.”
April 2009: The evening flight from Riga to Tashkent Airport on AirBaltic 
took just under six hours. We arrived at the Tashkent airport in the middle 
of the night and checked into the Radisson Hotel. After rest and breakfast, 
we walked through the streets to a nearby bazaar, Alay, to observe mundane 
activities and processes there. The first thing that attracted our attention was 
a black market for foreign currency exchange. We were welcomed by a group 
of money changers who immediately approached us, offering their currency 
exchange services. What struck us was that there were several policemen 
around; none of them, however, bothered about illegal transactions on the 
black market, thereby de-facto ‘decriminalising’ the informal practices of 
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money changers. We have observed many similar incidents in the Ferghana 
valley as well. What is evident is that it is almost impossible to buy foreign 
currency at the official exchange rate in the banks of Uzbekistan, and that 
is why the black market was the only available source where people could 
acquire foreign currency. We next turned our attention to the informal taxi 
sector. One of our interesting findings was that almost anybody in Tashkent 
could work as a taxi driver. As we had some official meetings with the ad-
ministration of one of the universities in Tashkent, we regularly used taxi 
services. There were no taxi stops and we did not have to order a taxi. Waving 
your hand at the side of the street was sufficient to find a taxi in a minute. 
Observing the magnitude of the informal taxi sector, we came to realise that 
it has become a major source of self-employment and income-generating op-
portunities for many of the urban unemployed in Tashkent. The interaction 
between the taxi drivers and traffic police is also based on informal rules. 
During our observations, we noticed that taxi drivers often shake the hands 
of traffic police with money when they break traffic rules, such as exceeding 
the speed limit or red light crossing. One interesting insight we gained was 
that the behaviour of both state officials and citizens were largely guided 
by informal rules, while the laws and regulations were almost indiscernible 
in everyday life. Hence, informality has become an inalienable part of the 
governance mode of the political regime in Uzbekistan, making up for the 
incapacity of the formal structures. 
Our field trip to rural Ferghana provided us with important insights on the 
existence of local standards and morality regarding how state officials should 
act. Our fieldsite Oqtepa,35 where we conducted observations in April-May 
2009 and June-August 2010, is one of the mahallas in Shabboda village in 
rural Ferghana and has a population of more than 2,000 people. Most of the 
residents in this mahalla were dehqonlar (farmers) involved in cucumber and 
grape production. However, due to our research focus, we were particularly 
interested in two mahalla residents, Sardor and Rahmon, who were both state 
officials and the centre of “everyday mahalla talk.” Sardor was a very high-
level state official and worked as the deputy chief of Ferghana region police, 
whereas Rahmon was a district level traffic policeman (a low-level official). 
However, in the everyday mahalla life, Sardor, despite having such a high 
official status, did not have a decent reputation and was often described as 
“communist,” the term that carries negative meaning and is used in relation 
to law-abiding state officials who do not share their political influence and 
resources with their kin and mahalla. As a high-level police official, Sardor 
had an enormous power and he could easily divert the resources of the state 
to mahalla, but he always rejected the requests of mahalla and asked them 
to solve their problems through formal channels. Because of his attempts to 
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keep his public office separate from private sphere, Sardor was regarded as 
“communist” in the words of many mahalla residents we encountered. On the 
other hand, low-level official Rahmon was a “man of respect” and enjoyed 
very high social status and reputation in mahalla. Unlike Sardor, Rahmon 
provided patronage to mahalla residents, for instance by helping mahalla 
residents to avoid or manoeuvre around the state law. Rahmon was especially 
praised for his ability to act as a bridge between high level state officials and 
ordinary residents in terms of negotiating the amount of informal payment 
for job or university admission issues, and bending state laws to meet the 
interests of mahalla residents. Therefore, when invited to weddings, Rahmon 
was always offered the “best table” and served more quickly than others. 
Thus, according to the mahalla’s norms, Sardor was neither good person nor 
good state official due to his law-abiding behaviour and unwillingness to help 
mahalla people, while Rahmon was the “pride of the mahalla,” due to his 
sensitivity to the needs and concerns of the mahalla. 
These observations show the existence of “everyday life governance” in 
Uzbekistan that is in conflict with the Western-centric definitions of good 
governance and yet embraces ritual forms, norms of sociability, and moral 
imperatives. As shown above, the state officials in rural Ferghana are torn 
between loyalty to their family and mahalla networks, and honesty at work. 
Therefore, maintaining loyalty and respect for such networks often comes at 
the expense of formal structures, thereby leading to an omnipresence of in-
formal practices in formal arenas. This indicates that behavioural instructions 
promoted by mahalla influence the implementation of state laws and regula-
tions. Although the mahalla-level relations described above may seem illicit 
or abnormal in the eyes of Western observers, it is however accepted within 
rural communities in Ferghana as legitimate coping strategy—regardless of 
whether they are licit or illicit. Seemingly, the analytical divide between pub-
lic office and private sphere is not useful in the context of Uzbekistan where 
the society is mostly based on collectivist traditions and kinship networks. 
Another relevant observation of the “everyday life governance” is the en-
counter with traffic police we experienced in May 2009 while travelling by 
taxi from Tashkent to Ferghana Valley. Perhaps unexpectedly for readers of 
this chapter who have not been to Central Asia, the traffic stops are one of the 
most frequent sites of state-citizen interaction in Uzbekistan and one of the 
most frequent topics of conversation. Hardly anyone who has been in a car in 
Uzbekistan has failed to witness the phenomenon of drivers being stopped, 
seemingly at random, and having their papers inspected, often resulting in 
the payment of a small bribe. Stories about resisting or subverting this ritual 
are the subject of popular folklore and YouTube videos.36 The power of the 
traffic police is rarely challenged in Uzbekistan, and ordinary people always 
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show maximum obedience when they interact with the police. Unlike in the 
West, when stopped by the police, citizens in Uzbekistan get out of the car 
and hand over documents to the policeman, addressing him as “commander.” 
Thus, the relations between the traffic police and citizens are very hierarchi-
cal.37 
There is only one route to Ferghana Valley via a mountain pass called 
Kamchik. Since Kamchik is the only route connecting the Fergana to the rest 
of Uzbekistan, it is heavily guarded, and there are many checkpoints where 
police and border officials check passports. One can also notice the large 
number of traffic police at the Kamchik pass. When we reached the pass, the 
driver asked us to unfasten our seat belts, as it was uncommon at that time to 
use seat belts. At least the traffic police did not impose any fine for driving 
without fastened seat belts.38 Hence, any use of seat belts by the driver or the 
passengers could be a clear signal that there was a foreigner/non-native in the 
car, which may easily attract the attention of the traffic police, always seeking 
reasons to stop cars. In requesting us not to use the seat belts, the driver was 
actually trying to avoid any unnecessary attention from the police. However, 
out of concern for his personal safety, Måns Svensson, one of the authors 
of this paper, did not unfasten his seat belt. As the driver predicted, our car 
was soon stopped by the traffic police. As usual, they checked the driver’s 
documents. Due to the presence of a foreign citizen in the car, the police also 
wanted to check the car’s luggage compartment. Svensson, suspicious of the 
actions of the police, demanded that he be present while they checked the 
luggage compartment. This was an open challenge to the traffic policeman’s 
traditional authority. Trying to avoid conflict with a foreign citizen, the po-
liceman decided not to check the luggage compartment and politely asked 
Svensson to sit in the car. Instead, the policeman ordered the driver to follow 
him to his small office to discuss some minor details in his car documents. 
After ten minutes, the driver returned to the car with an angry face and told 
us that he had to pay 15,000 som39 because of Svensson’s failure to “show 
proper respect” towards the policeman. Not wanting the driver to take the 
consequences of his action, Svensson later covered the costs of the driver. 
This observation provides useful insights into everyday forms of gover-
nance in Uzbekistan. As a foreigner, Svensson was unaware of local social 
norms and hierarchies. By demanding to be present during the luggage check, 
Svensson challenged the traditional authority of the policeman as the one who 
dictates the rules. According to Uzbek law, Svensson’s actions were entirely 
legal. However, from an “everyday life governance” perspective, his actions 
were not consistent with prevalent social norms and hierarchies, which re-
sulted in the indirect imposition of a 15,000 som fine. Certainly, the incident 
described was a clear instance of corruption, since the police officer forcibly 
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extorted money from the driver (and the driver was angry and humiliated). 
But what struck us was that corruption was triggered by Svensson’s failure to 
show due respect to the policeman (a violation of the expected form and the 
normative sociability). Consequently, this observation may provide a starting 
point for us to reconsider the nature and context of informal transactions in 
Uzbekistan not only as instances of illegality, but also view them as manifes-
tations of everyday forms of governance. 
Thus, our observations provided us with important insights about the nature 
of everyday life governance in Uzbekistan. It struck us that in Uzbekistan, 
informality has become the part and parcel of the governance mode where 
both ordinary citizens and state officials are involved in the exchange and 
reciprocation of material goods, favours, money and services. Wherever we 
looked—at institutions such as markets, banks, hospitals, traffic police—we 
observed the existence of a multitude of informal rules governing economic 
and social relations. A similar situation was also observed in Johan Rasanaya-
gam’s study in which he claimed that informal economy is so influential in 
Uzbekistan that, in a sense, it is all that there is.40 Hence, despite the almost 
mythical coercive power of the political regime in Uzbekistan, especially 
the regime’s ability to withstand internal and external challenges, we found 
that the state and its legal system have limited meaning in everyday life, and 
the coping strategies of ordinary citizens are mainly informal. Even the be-
haviour of state officials was more influenced by the informal rules than the 
law of the state. We realised that it is not the law, but the informal rules and 
norms that have more meaning and influence in everyday life in Uzbekistan. 
We have thus come to the conclusion that there is “everyday life governance” 
in Uzbekistan that dominates social and economic life itself. These processes 
will be more specifically demonstrated in the next section, with reference to 
two informal interviews with traffic policeman and midwife. 
EVERYDAY LIFE GOVERNANCE AS GETTING THINGS DONE
In this section, we present the results of two informal interviews with key in-
formants. Our aim is to illustrate how things get done, how they are perceived 
by the ordinary citizens and low-level state officials, and their implications 
for understanding governance trajectories in Uzbekistan. The interviews 
were conducted in the Ferghana region of Uzbekistan and focus on two state 
arenas/institutions: (1) the practice of traffic safety enforcement; and (2) the 
practice of maternity services. The first interview is centred around Dilshod, 
a traffic policeman, and the second focuses on Umida, a midwife at maternity 
hospital in Ferghana. In the subsequent sections Dilshod, and Umida, speak 
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in the first person, and the authors’ comments are provided to explain and 
analyse the context. 
Dilshod, A Traffic Policeman: I “Sell” Traffic Tickets to Drivers to 
Earn A Salary
It is not so easy to work as a traffic policeman in Uzbekistan. We have to 
communicate with more than a hundred people on a daily basis. We do not 
have fixed working hours. If you want to get a job with the traffic police, you 
have to pay a bribe, around 6,000–7,000 USD, to top officials of the traffic 
police. The biggest problem is, actually, that we do not get paid a salary for 
our work. The official salary for traffic policemen is 900,000 som41, but in 
fact, we do not receive any salary. In rare cases, we might receive 10% of this 
salary, 100,000 som. Of course, you may wonder how we survive. Here is the 
reality for you: Instead of paying salary, our administration provides us with 
traffic tickets which we may sell to drivers to earn a salary.42 We usually sell 
these tickets to drivers who drive without having their seat belt fastened and/
or drive cars which do not meet technical safety standards. The price of one 
traffic ticket is 12,500 som. So we earn our salary by selling traffic tickets to 
drivers. Since we do not get any salary, we are not required to return ticket 
receipts or reports to our administration and can keep the revenues made 
from the ticket sales.
This is not the end of the story. Our bosses give us the order (i.e. set the 
standard) to sell at least twenty tickets per day. However, drivers do not vio-
late traffic rules every day. How can we sell twenty tickets per day? If I do not 
sell twenty tickets per day, I might get a warning from the administration or 
even lose my job. Under these circumstances, we are under strong pressure 
to find drivers to sell tickets to. There is also an informal monthly payment 
called ‘gruz’ (burden) which we have to pay directly into our bosses’ pocket. 
The amount of this monthly payment ranges from 50,000 to 100,000 soms. We 
have to make this payment if we want to keep our job. These circumstances 
compel us to sell tickets even to drivers who act legally. Ordinary people do 
not know about these problems and therefore hate us. It is politics. We cannot 
talk about these problems openly.
I know many people look upon traffic police as the most corrupt profession 
in Uzbekistan. Since we do not receive any salary from the state for our work, 
the money we earn through selling tickets is completely legal. I am also an 
ordinary man, like everybody else; I have a family, kids to feed! Instead of 
giving salary, our bosses force us to earn our salary through selling tickets 
to drivers. So tell me, how should I feed my kids when the state does not pay 
me any salary? Had I received a normal salary, I would not bother selling 
tickets to law-abiding drivers.
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Umida, A Midwife: ‘I Will Not Be Able to Feed My Kids If I 
Follow The Law’
I know maternity hospitals are often criticized for being one of the most cor-
rupt places in Uzbekistan. But those people and organizations who label us 
‘corrupt’ are unaware of the serious problems we face in our daily working 
life. I think all problems are connected to the state and system. During the So-
viet era, the state provided everything for hospitals and physicians received 
a good salary. But, after independence, the state significantly decreased 
financing for hospitals. There is a serious shortage of medical equipment. 
Hospitals are over-crowded. Electricity and gas cuts are very common. The 
state does not supply us with necessary medicaments.
According to law, all maternity hospitals are state-owned in Uzbekistan, 
which means giving birth in a hospital must be free of charge. But this law 
is rarely enforced in practice. Almost everyone pays for maternity services. 
Of course, we accept their payment informally through hand-shaking. Often, 
people themselves slip money into our pocket. Such informal payments are 
called suyunchi (literally “joy” in English), where the father or relatives of 
the new born baby give cash (or sometimes expensive gifts) to the midwife 
and nurses who deliver the baby. Suyunchi is usually given after the birth of a 
child. The amount of suyunchi varies from one case to another, ranging from 
anywhere between 50,000 to 500,000 som. If it is an uncomplicated vaginal 
birth, people give us suyunchi of around 50,000–100,000 som. In cases of 
complicated vaginal births or C-sections, we receive a lot more suyunchi, 
approximately 300,000–500,000 som. 
I know my actions are illegal according to law, but real life circumstances 
force me to accept suyunchi from patients. Law and real life are completely 
different things. You will understand what I mean after I explain my work 
conditions. First, it is very difficult to get a job at a maternity hospital. For 
instance, if you want to work as a nurse at our hospital, you must pay a bribe 
of at least 500 USD to top health officials. Second, our salaries are extremely 
low. A midwife’s monthly salary is 280,000 som, around 100 USD, and a 
nurse’s salary is 180,000 som (65 USD). Isn’t it frustrating when you pay a 
500 USD bribe in order to get a job with a 100 USD salary? Our salary is 
very low, but I have to feed my kids. I studied for seven years to become a 
midwife, but I do not receive a high enough salary to live on from the state. 
Due to my good education, I believe I should earn more money than people 
who sell potatoes at the bazaar. I, too, have my own dreams, so I want to 
have a good salary. Everything is expensive at the bazaar. For example, one 
kilo of meat costs 17,000 som and one sack of flour is 60,000 som. I have to 
buy clothes for my kids. So, you see, it is impossible to survive on my 280,000 
som salary. Since the state does not reward me properly, I have a full right 
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to supplement my salary through suyunchi. I do not force anyone to give 
suyunchi, but people themselves voluntarily reward me. This is the only way 
to feed my kids and I do not see any other alternatives. I will not be able to 
feed my kids if I follow the law. Therefore, it is quite understandable that we 
expect people to reward us for our efforts.
To what extent do the stories of midwife and traffic policeman are com-
parable? In our opinion, they are comparable with respect to their “making-
ends-meet” character. Their professional sphere, the amounts of informal 
payments, the ways of bending the law and other details may vary, but the 
contextual factors, reasoning, and substance are similar and they both indicate 
the existence of “everyday life governance” that is normative, predictable, 
and articulated in relation to formal law. 
The interview with traffic policeman reveals that traffic police look at 
traffic tickets as a commodity for earning income rather than a means to 
enforce state traffic laws. When describing his informal practices, the traffic 
policeman tends to use the expression “selling tickets to drivers” rather than 
saying “imposing a fine on drivers.” This shows that the work ethics of traf-
fic policeman is guided by the unwritten rules. Second, the traffic policeman 
claims that his salary earning (ticket selling) practices are completely legal, 
since he does not receive any salary from the state for his arduous work. In 
the light of these problems, one conclusion could be that informal practices 
allow low-level state officials such as traffic police to survive in the absence 
of decent salaries. This situation reminds us of Abel Polese’s anthropological 
study on Ukraine in which he concluded that corruption needs to be rede-
fined, at least when dealing with cases in which it helps people to survive.43 
Third, the interview illustrates that corruption has different meanings and 
logic within different levels of society, and that there is a difference between 
masses of low-level officials on the one hand and the smaller group of state 
elites on the other. For instance, the elite level corruption, rent-seeking, and 
“clan struggles” described by scholars such as Ilkhamov and Collins are not 
the same as the everyday “getting things done” practices of low-level traffic 
policemen.44 During the interview, the traffic policeman expressed concerns 
for his working conditions and criticized the unreasonable demands of his 
administration. He frequently mentioned that he has to follow the unwritten 
rules of his organization in order to keep his job.
The midwife’s story also shows that the gap between law, which states 
that maternity services should be free of charge, and actual delivery (the lack 
of state financing for hospitals and low salaries), forced maternity hospital 
workers to frantically search for informal coping strategies that help them 
survive in the absence of decent salaries. As the midwife asserts, she will 
not be able to feed her children had she followed the law. Seemingly, since 
17_891_Burghart.indb   502 1/10/18   7:00 AM
 Everyday Life Governance in Post-Soviet Uzbekistan 503
Uzbek authorities fail to secure the basic needs of its citizens, so the state of-
ficials such as midwife and traffic policeman do not feel any moral obligation 
to act in compliance with the law. According to the midwife’s moral code, 
her informal practices are completely “legal,” and she has a full right to reap 
the benefits of her good education. Subsequently, informal transactions that 
are interpreted as corrupt in the Western moral and juridical codes could be 
regarded as morally acceptable behavior according to the unwritten rules of 
maternity hospitals in Uzbekistan. 
CONCLUSION
In one country, a driver stopped for speeding quickly pays a small amount of 
money to a traffic policeman, knowing most of it will go to feed the police-
man’s family. In another country, the same driver goes through a much longer 
and more expensive process knowing that the violation will have a negative 
impact on her auto insurance costs, might show up on a background check, 
and that the fine money goes to an impersonal bureaucracy run by an official 
she voted against. In which scenario is the driver more free, in which more 
tormented? The informal transaction we call corruption and the formal trans-
action is considered good governance, but both transactions are imbued with 
affect, morality, sociability, and predictability. 
We assume that good governance leads to long-term benefits to the com-
mon good: bad drivers are punished and become safer drivers; fines go to 
benefit the community, not a single family; insurance companies and mu-
nicipal authorities cooperate to produce a broader sense of generalized trust 
in society. But what are our assumptions about the corruption scenario? We 
have argued that this kind of “petty corruption” is far from disorderly and 
immoral, but are these informal practices also contributing to the common 
good, as culturally appropriate means of exchange that reinforce sociability 
and interdependence, strengthening the social fabric? Our answer is a quali-
fied yes, but qualified because it seems equally true that people are making 
the best of a bad situation where the state has largely withdrawn from all but 
its functions maintaining political stability and interethnic peace. 
Returning to Krasner’s point, is everyday life governance in Uzbekistan 
the “good enough governance” that is the best many societies can hope for? 
Does it provide for individual physical security, public order, limited eco-
nomic growth, security from transnational threats, basic health and sanitation 
services (all yes so far), checks on high level corruption (no), and minimal 
mechanisms of accountability such as media and civil society (also no)?45 
Krasner argues that democracy promotion activities often create instability, 
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but that good enough governance creates the kind of stability that eventually 
gives birth to a moderately prosperous middle class, which in turn will push 
for democratic reforms on its own. Uzbekistan’s strong coercive state has 
produced security for most citizens and overall stability, but its weak welfare 
state has withdrawn from the social sphere and in its place informal gover-
nance systems have emerged. The coexistence of these two strong/weak state 
systems may be the main reason for the regime’s longevity. It remains to be 
seen if kleptocracy and the top-down closing of spaces for civil society and 
diverse expression will be an Achilles heel that prevents Krasner’s scenario 
of an expanding middle class from coming to fruition in Uzbekistan.
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